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Sartre and Husserl

The Imaginary

This flow traces how Sartre draws on Husserl’s intentionality and phenomenological method while developing an independent account of the image.

increasingupBearing stren­gth in each eventdowndecreasing
Reading PhenomenologyReading Phenomenology from "The Imaginary". A New Philosophical Resource Consciousness directed outward Sartre’s encounter with Edmund Husserl helps him reject the idea that consciousness is a container…
A New Philosophical Resource Consciousness directed outward Sartre’s encounter with Edmund Husserl helps him reject the idea that consciousness is a container filled with mental objects. The principle that consciousness is always of something redirects the analysis toward intentional acts. This orientation offers a way to describe experience without treating consciousness as one more thing in the world. A method adopted Phenomenology supports Sartre’s effort to begin from what reflection reveals. It also gives him a vocabulary for distinguishing the object intended from the manner in which it is intended.
The Image as Intentional ActThe Image as Intentional Act from "The Imaginary". Applying Intentionality A distinct manner of intending Sartre applies Husserl’s broad insight to imagination: consciousness does not contain an image of Pierre…
Applying Intentionality A distinct manner of intending Sartre applies Husserl’s broad insight to imagination: consciousness does not contain an image of Pierre but aims directly at Pierre in an imaging manner. The image is the relation, not a miniature object. This account preserves the object’s transcendence while explaining why it can be intended even when absent. A critical use Sartre’s borrowing is not passive repetition. His analysis presses the distinction between perception, thought, and imagery into a detailed psychology of how the object appears.
A Different Account of FulfilmentA Different Account of Fulfilment from "The Imaginary". From Inheritance to Dispute The question of knowledge Sartre challenges a simple reading of Husserl’s account in which an image fulfils an empty signification.
From Inheritance to Dispute The question of knowledge Sartre challenges a simple reading of Husserl’s account in which an image fulfils an empty signification. He insists that the image is itself a consciousness and that knowledge changes as it enters an imaging act. Imaging knowledge does not merely receive sensory completion; it becomes an active structure directed toward sensible presence. An independent path The result is a theory indebted to phenomenology yet distinct in emphasis. Sartre uses the method to develop his own account of affectivity, movement, and irreality.
1933, as Sartre begins studying Husserl
During Part I’s account of image consciousness
In Part II’s discussion of knowledge and image